

China and the International System: The Formation of a Chinese Model of World Order¹

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Abstract

During its 72-year history, China has followed a difficult path in its efforts to change the diplomatic strategies of its relations with the outside world. The first period, marked by the 30 years from 1949 to 1978, was ideological; it was directed by Mao Zedong and completely ignored international organizations (IOs). The next 30 years (1978–2008) defined a second, economic, period, which was determined by Deng Xiaoping's policy of reforms and opening up, and by the gradual embedding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into IOs. Now, China is implementing a third, political, stage under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who set the country to the tasks of great power diplomacy and the formation of new/alternative international structures in which it plays a leading role and has a real impact on the future model of the system of international relations.

The formation of the PRC in 1949 and the Korean War (1950–53) that followed soon after, during which Chinese “volunteer” soldiers fought against the United Nations (UN) forces, blocked the possibility of contact between the PRC and this universal international organization for two decades. The country's internal problems in the form of a “cultural revolution” also did not contribute to the solution of this problem. Even the restoration of the PRC's rights in the UN in 1971, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, and Deng Xiaoping's reforms could not significantly accelerate the PRC's accession to other international organizations. This process took about 20 more years and, on the whole, ended only in 2001 with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the 21st century, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China began to actively use existing organizations and to create new ones with partner countries.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the Chinese academic discourse on the problem of relations between the PRC and international organizations and the international system, in which western countries, headed by the United States, dominate to this day, and in which China does not see a prospect for itself to take a place worthy of its complex power. The history of the formation of relations between the PRC and the international system is examined, the reasons for the dissatisfaction of the PRC with its status in its structures are identified, and the process of creating international organizations in which China occupies a dominant position and, in global competition with the United States, can influence the future model of the world is traced.

The specific contribution of this article derives from the fact that it mainly uses the works of Chinese authors who study the position of their country in relation to the international system. It is concluded that China is actively formatting its geo-economic space, offering the countries of the Global South, which are part of it, not only material dividends, but also China's values, development model, and vision for a future model of the world.

Keywords: China, international organizations, discourse, assumptions, Xi Jinping, structuring of international relations

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In international relations, the growing trend of “transit of power” from the United States to China [Degtarev, Ramich, Tsvyk, 2021] and China’s relations with international organizations, which act as the main tool in global governance [Grachikov, 2020], have gradually become the central topic of academic research [Larionova, Shelepov, 2021; Fried, 2021]. As a rule, they are comprehended from several theoretical approaches. Thus, Samuel Kim characterized China’s relationship with the international system as moving from the “transformation of the system” approach in the period of 1949–1970 to the “reform of the system” approach in the 1970s, and to the “maintenance of the system and its exploitation” approach of the 1980s. and 1990s. He also argued that China’s behavior in the international system is characterized by a “maxi-mini approach,” that is, a strategy to maximize the benefits of participation in the system and minimize regulatory requirements such as costs and expenses in the form of dependence and loss of sovereignty [Kim, 1994].

Ann Kent draws attention to defensive reactions within China that emphasize that international cooperation and interdependence protect and advance US hegemonic interests. These reactions reflect the general ambivalence of globalization, which, unlike the concept of modernization, puts China at serious risk of losing control of its own politics. This duality explains China’s insistence that interdependence and globalization must not undermine national sovereignty. While officially recognizing international organizations as subjects of international law, Beijing denies that they are “supranational” or political entities in the same sense as sovereign states. On the one hand, China is counting on international organizations to confer international prestige, status, and domestic legitimacy, and to solve the problems inherent in globalization. On the other hand, Beijing prefers to use bilateral mechanisms to resolve interstate or intrastate conflicts and views international relations from a realistic or, as some believe, culturally realistic, rather than a liberal point of view [Kent, 2013, 132–166].

Alastair Johnston in his study “The Social State. China in International Institutions. 1980–2000” examines these relationships from the positions of constructivism – the socialization of China into the international community. He identifies three micro-processes – mimicking, social influence and persuasion, to analyze China’s participation in a number of international institutions on security issues, such as: the UN Conference on Disarmament, the ASEAN Regional Forum and regional multilateral dialogues on security issues [Johnston, 2008].

Well-known Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong, clearly disagreeing with such approaches, writes an article “The Anachronism of a China Socialized: Why Engagement Is Not All It’s Cracked Up to Be.” Yan argues that the effects of engagement/socialization are often overstated and oversold, because conventional constructivists, in their attempt to specify the conditions under which certain behavioral adaptation constitutes identity change, tend to obfuscate some issues of theoretical and methodological concern. First, transnationalism, as it pertains to China, has a poor record of engendering and sustaining domestic political change, because the party-state, firmly in the driver’s seat, fiercely rebuffs any foreign attempt that it deems to undermine its iron-clad hold on state power. Secondly, international institutions are not as

transformative as claimed by constructivists, who conflate the distinction between agents and principals. Furthermore, the socialization perspective's penchant for positioning the state in question in a reactive mode can be an analytical straitjacket, in turn rendering it outdated and inadequate to capture the critically important dynamics and dimensions of a great power such as China in international politics and global governance. Yan Xuetong calls for a more comprehensive and eclectic approach that understands China as a proactive participant in international affairs [Yan, 2017, 67–94].

This sharp rejection of Western analytical approaches by Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese international scholar, stimulates our interest in Chinese content proper and academic discourse on the relationship between China and the international system. The purpose of the article is to analyze the academic discourse on China's relations with international organizations and the system as a whole, to study the controversial process of China's entry into international organizations, due to the historical memory of the Chinese people during the "one hundred years of humiliation" period and China's semi-colonial status in the international system, the formation of China as a global power with ambitions to create their own model of the world order.

Bibliography Overview

The bibliography analysis is divided into two parts. The first analyzes the literature of the initial stage of relations between the PRC and international organizations, which covers the period from 1949 to 2001, the second – the PRC in the international system, the period from 2001 to the present.

In researching relations between China and international organizations, Chinese scientists, according to Wang Yizhou, another well-known international specialist in China, have not achieved noticeable success. Apart from the publication of a number of special textbooks, there have been no theoretical works on this issue [Wang, 2002]. Previous studies on China's relations with international organizations in Chinese academic circles mainly represent two directions: firstly, these are the works of international lawyers, in which they introduced legal knowledge to the Chinese audience. A special place in this process is occupied by teams of scientists led by professor Wang Teya from Peking University and professor Liang Xi from Wuhan University, who not only translated a large number of foreign works, but also introduced their colleagues to the basics of international law. They explored the evolution of the international system as well as the integration of the Chinese legal system and legal concepts with the international system. In addition, work was carried out on specific areas of mechanisms and conventions, such as an introduction to international environmental law, an analysis of the European Community and the European Union and its legal framework, a discussion of the rules of the World Trade Organization and a comparison of the stages of development of a convention on international human rights, etc. [Zhu, Jiang, 2000; Ma, 1994; Liu, Zhu, 2000; Liu, 1996; Zhang, 1998].

To stimulate research in the field of international law, since 2011, Xiamen University has been publishing an all-China yearbook – the journal "International Relations and International Law," in which not only Chinese but also foreign scholars are published.²

Secondly, these are the studies of political scientists of universal international organizations and their international mechanisms, among which most of them are represented by the works of Li Te-cheng from the UN Research Center of Peking University of Language and Culture [Li, 1995; Chen, Li, 1993; Li, 1993]. Some works in the field of political science also

² 国际关系与国际法学期刊 / 刘志云主编 [Journal of International Relations and International Law. Chief editor Liu Zhiyun].

represent studies of a number of specialized global and regional international organizations and mechanisms, such as the European Union, ASEAN, the Warsaw Pact, the Organization of American States, the League of Nations, etc. [Wang, Wang, 1998]. A significant part of the content of Chinese studies is “graft transplantation” (yízhí jiàjiē, “移植嫁接”), i.e. copying (Western) knowledge, which did little for internal changes, primarily legal ones, in China, and their impact on China’s relations with international organizations.

Separately, it should be said about the book “International Organizations and Group Studies” edited by Qu Liang and Han De. Zhang Lili of the Diplomatic Academy prepared the chapter “Development of Relations between China and International Organizations.” The main feature of the monograph is a comprehensive introduction to the current state and a brief history of international organizations, both universal and regional (political, economic and military, including political parties, parliamentary organizations, women’s associations, etc.) [Qu, Han, 1989].

The logical conclusion of the study of this topic was the publication of “Introduction to International Organizations” edited by Zhang Lihua. In the “Introduction” the first few chapters are devoted to the study of the theory of international organizations, then the problems of globalization of international organizations, regional integration, international organizations and state sovereignty, national security, international order are considered. The last, 13th chapter “China and International Organizations” is devoted to the evolution of the development of China’s relations with international structures and the analysis of China’s position on the problems of the international situation, complex power, sovereignty, the influence of ideology and identity [Zhang, 2015].

A notable publication exploring the relationship between the PRC and the international system was the collective monograph “China and the International System: Process and Practice. Zhu Liqiong et al.,” which examines the process of China’s “engagement/entry” (Zhongguo canyu 中国参与) in organizations such as the WTO, IMF, WB, WHO, institutions for nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, climate change negotiations and various structures of the UN [Zhu, 2012]. Wang Mingguo’s work is devoted to the rather rare topic “Investigation of causal relationships in the effectiveness of the international system.” The author comes to the conclusion that since the 60s of the XX century in international organizations there has been a struggle between developing and developed countries on the “principles of financing technology” (the right to vote), which led to the fact that after the global financial crisis of 2008, China, India, Brazil, and other new market economies have had some success in resisting the “hegemonic order of governance” (Wang, 2014, 384).

Theoretical Approaches

When examining China’s position in relation to international organizations and the international system as a whole, several assumptions must be kept in mind related to China’s history and its relationship with the Western world. *First*. Before the first Opium War (1840), China was the center of interstate relations in East Asia and did not directly intersect with the European system of international relations [Zhang, 2015, 5–, 2014, 1–6; Kang, 2010; Chen, 2007, 1–22]. The naval aggression of England in the form of “opium” wars and the unequal treaties that followed them violated sovereignty, destroyed territorial integrity and turned China into a semi-colonial country [Li, 2016; Grachikov, 2015]. “One Hundred Years of Humiliation” (1840–1949) – this is how Chinese historiography describes the subordinate and humiliating nature of its international position [Zhao, Chen, 2014, 2–3; Zheng, 2012; Grachikov, 2021a]. The historical experience of a semi-colonial situation, when the West interfered in China’s

internal affairs, determined Beijing's negative attitude towards international organizations controlled by Western countries for decades to come. Therefore, Xi Jinping's call for the creation of international organizations of developing countries led by China is understandable [Xi, 2014, 48].

The second assumption that must be taken into account is that the PRC immediately after its creation took part in the Korean War (1950–1953), where it fought against the combined forces of the UN, which froze China's relations with this organization for two decades. During the first three decades under the leadership of Mao Zedong, China did not express its desire to join international structures. In addition, China considered any mention of any national interests outside its state as aggression and violation of the sovereignty of other states, similar to what China experienced during the period of a hundred years of humiliation (1840–1949) [Xu, 2006, 18, 19; Grachikov, 2021b].

As stated in the “Practical Handbook of International Relations”, the international system has gradually developed along with the expansion of capitalism around the world. The colonial behavior of capitalism links the initially isolated regions of the world into an international system, which was finally formed in the late 19th century and early 20th century on the basis of the final establishment of the world colonial system. The international system is divided into two types: the level of local structure and the level of general structure, depending on the geographical coverage and scale. The main characteristics of the international system include: 1. *Integrity*, all state and non-state actors are included in the international system; 2. *Interrelation*, in which all subjects of the system inevitably participate in direct or indirect connection; 3. *Non-direction against you*. In the international system, the difference in combined strength between countries has led to a gap in the level of (national) strength, so there is an inequality between large and small countries; 4. *Objectivity*. The international system exists objectively and any international entity must formulate its own security and development strategies based on the international system [Huang, Yao, 2013, 245, 246].

The theoretical toolkit of Chinese works is Zhu Liqiong's concept of “practice of participation” (参与实践) of China in the international system. As a format for theoretical analysis, such criteria as “practice of participation” (参与实践) and “recognition of identity” (身份承认) are taken. There are three forms of recognition of China's identity by the international system: official recognition (形式承认), essence recognition (实质性承认), and recognition of actor values (主体价值承认), which are the end result of participatory practice, where participatory practice acts as an independent variable, and identity recognition is the dependent variable. Different degrees of recognition by the international system means a different new identity for China and a different degree of participation. Practitioners are re-engaged in the practice in a new capacity and begin a new round of practice. China's participation in the international system reflects such a constant and continuous new process of practice [Zhu, 2012, 2].

The Practice Process of China's Participation in the International System

In the international political science of the PRC, there are different versions of the establishment and development of relations between China and international organizations. This difference applies to almost all international organizations, which is caused by different understanding in China of its national interests in various international structures. Zhang Lihua describes the periodization of China's entry into international organizations/participation practices as follows [Zhang, 2015, 235–248].

Period of “Relative Deviation” 相对排斥 (1949–1965)

During this period, China resisted participation in international organizations and had very limited ties with a few international organizations. This was a time when China was outside the UN system and ideologically exposed to the confrontational and antagonistic Cold War mentality. The main situation faced by China was isolation from the international community, which limited its participation and determined its attitude towards international organizations. The perception of Chinese leaders about international organizations at this stage was rather negative. China did not participate in international organizations mainly because China did not trust the guidelines of any international organization. The speeches of Premier Zhou Enlai and other leaders showed that China has been conservative and cautious towards the UN and other international organizations. In China’s view, these international organizations were controlled by Western powers, while Third World countries had little leverage. Thus, it reflected the inequality of the world political system. Under such circumstances, China had a very limited choice: the possibility of joining the international organizations of socialist countries and developing relations with international organizations of developing countries. Direct examples include the Geneva Conference in 1954, where Premier Zhou Enlai put forward the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” and the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, which brought together most of the third world countries, as well as China’s close relations with Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Period of “Active Deflection” 加剧排斥 (1966–1970)

Period 1966–1970 was the most active phase of the so-called. cultural revolution and “leftism” in the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. As Zhang Lihua explains, the rupture of allied relations with the USSR and inter-party ties between the CPSU and the CPC caused significant harm to China’s relations with the countries of the socialist camp. However, in just one year (1966–1967), China managed to establish (or half establish, ban jian jiao 半建交) diplomatic relations with more than 40 countries, with 30 of which there were diplomatic “disputes” (jiufen 纠纷) caused by the “revolutionary” rhetoric.

Period of “Limited Entry (Participation)” 有限参与期 (1971–1991)

On October 25, 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations voted to restore the legitimate rights of the People’s Republic of China in the UN and withdraw Taiwan from the Organization and all its institutions. As a result of the vote, the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority: 76 votes in favor, 35 against and 17 abstentions.

Table 1. Reflects the process of the PRC’s accession to the main universal international organizations

| Year of Entry | Name of International Organization |
|----------------------|---|
| 1952 | International Red Cross |
| 1971 | United Nations |
| 1971 | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| 1972 | World Health Organization |
| 1976 | International Olympic Committee |
| 1980 | International Monetary Fund |

| Year of Entry | Name of International Organization |
|---------------|--|
| 1980 | World Bank |
| 1984 | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| 1984 | International Criminal Police Organization |
| 1991 | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |

Source: Compiled by the authors.

By 2000, China became a member of more than 50 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and 275 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). This contrasted with the situation in 1966, when he was a member of only one intergovernmental organization and 58 international non-governmental organizations. In terms of the number of IGOs by 2000, China ranked seventh in the Asia-Pacific region after Japan, India and Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Malaysia. In terms of INGO membership, China ranked sixth in the region behind Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand and South Korea [Kent, 2013, 132–166].

Period of “Active Participation” 积极参与期 (1992–2008)

On May 3, 1993, the Bureau of International Exhibitions adopted a resolution accepting China as the 46th member state of the organization. On December 3, 2002, Shanghai won the right to host the 2010 World Expo.

On November 10, 2001, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Doha, Qatar, reviewed and decided on China’s accession to the WTO by consensus, marking the end of a 15-year negotiation process for China’s accession to the WTO. China has officially become the 143rd member of the WTO. On November 19, six representatives of the Chinese government attended the WTO General Council for the first time as a full member.

On February 5, 2001, the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund adopted a resolution to increase China’s share in the organization from 4.687 billion SDRs to 6.376 billion, lifting China from 11th to 8th place.

On November 9, 2006, Chen Fengfu from Hong Kong (PRC) was elected as the new Director-General of WHO, making the PRC representative the highest ranking person in the UN agency. On May 29, 2007, the 75th Congress of the International Committee for Animal Health (OIE) confirmed by an overwhelming majority of 131 votes in favor, 5 abstentions and 8 votes against that China had joined the organization as a sovereign nation.

On June 29, 2007, the world’s leading international anti-money laundering organization, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), agreed that China is a full member of this organization.

The Period of “Awareness of a New Role” (2009–2012)

China tends to make the most of its status as a developing country. For example, although China is among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the rate of China’s contribution to the regular budget of the Organization is below 1 percent, which in 1979 was reduced at the request of China from 5.5% to 0.79%, compared with 25%, paid by the United States, and 19.9% paid by Japan, a country that is not even a permanent member of the Security Council. As China’s economy continued to develop and its overall national strength increased,

China's financial contribution to the UN budget also began to increase. The share of the PRC increased from 0.7% at the end of the last century to 2.053% in 2005 and then to 2.667% in 2009. After the last adjustment in 2010, China's current dues ratio was 3.189%, and the cost of maintaining peace also rose from 3.147% in 2009 to 3.939%. Supporting international peace and security, China is not only one of the main providers of UN peacekeeping funds, but also the country with the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. From 1990 to the end of 2009, China sent a total of 14,650 people to UN peacekeeping operations who took part in UN operations in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Lebanon, Sudan, Ivory Coast and East Timor [Li, 2010].

As a major developing country, China has always supported developing country organizations. China is not a member of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, but it has always maintained good relations with the two organizations of developing countries. China actively participated in the activities of the Group of 77 as an observer. In 1995, China officially joined the dialogue and became the center for the development of South-South cooperation. Since 2002, China has contributed \$100,000 annually to these activities, and \$200,000 since 2010. China also supports and contributes to regional organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, China has long supported the African Union (AU) in various ways, including helping to build the AU Convention Center, funding the AU to participate in the Shanghai World Expo, and donating office equipment to the AU.

With the growth of national power and the accumulation of experience, China's contribution to international organizations and international institutions is increasing. For example, since 1990, China has increasingly become a meeting place for international organizations. In 1995, Beijing hosted the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, which was attended by government delegations from 189 countries, as well as organizations and specialized agencies of the UN system. The 22nd Congress of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1999 was held in China, and this was the first time that a UN specialized agency had held a plenipotentiary conference in China.

The success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics has greatly enhanced China's opportunities and attractiveness to international organizations. In recent years, more and more representatives of the PRC have taken leadership positions in international organizations. For example, in 2005, Zhang Xinseng was elected President of the UNESCO Executive Board. In 2006, Chen Fengfu was elected Director General of the World Health Organization. In 2007, Li Jinhua, Auditor General of the National Audit Office of China, was successfully elected a member of the UN Audit Committee. Major General Zhao Jingmin, an official of the Peacekeeping Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Defense, became the first high-ranking official of a UN peacekeeping operation. In 2008, Lin Yifu became Vice President of the World Bank. In 2010, Zhu Min was Special Adviser to the President of the International Monetary Fund, and Xue Yuqin was Chairman of the UN International Law Commission and Judge of the International Court of Justice.

In 2013, then-UN Secretary-General Pan Ki-moon appointed Xu Haoliang as Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Program and Director of the Asia Pacific Bureau.

By 2007, there were 61,836 international organizations in the world. China was a member of 4386 of them, and since 1753 has signed accession agreements [Zhu, 2012, 1]. In 2021, the number of governmental and non-governmental international organizations in the world increased to 66425, and China became a member of 5479 of them. At the same time, the secretariats of 251 organizations were located in China [UIA, 2021].

Chinese World Strategy (2013–2021)

China's disagreement with the existing world system and the inability to increase its influence there resulted (see Tables 2 and 3) in a gradual change in existing and creation of alternative international institutions.

Table 2. Voting power distribution in major international nancial institutions (% of total voting power in a given institution), 31 December 2017

| Shareholder | Voting Power | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | IBRD | | IMF | ADB | AfDB | IADB | EBRD |
| | 2010 | 2017 | | | | | |
| US | 16.4 | 16.0 | 16.5 | 12.8 | 6.6 | 30.0 | 10.1 |
| Japan | 7.9 | 6.9 | 6.2 | 12.8 | 5.5 | 5.0 | 8.6 |
| Big Four European countries | 15.9 | 14.3 | 16.4 | 9.6 | 12.1 | 6.7 | 34.4 |
| China | 2.8 | 4.5 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 1.2 | 0.004 | 0.1 |
| IDA & IBRD borrowing members | 37.1 | 39.3 | n.a. | 39.1 | 59.2 | 50.02 | 14.4 |

Sources: [Galan, Leandro, 2019].

Abbreviations used in the table: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Table 3. Relative weight in world's Gross Domestic Product measured in current US dollars (% , 1993–2017)

| Shareholder | 1993 | 1997 | 2001 | 2005 | 2009 | 2013 | 2017 |
|------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| US | 26.6 | 27.4 | 31.8 | 27.6 | 24.0 | 21.7 | 24.0 |
| Japan | 17.2 | 14.0 | 12.9 | 10.0 | 8.7 | 6.7 | 6.0 |
| Big Four European Countries | 21.4 | 20.6 | 18.3 | 19.9 | 17.8 | 14.8 | 13.4 |
| China | 1.7 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 8.5 | 12.5 | 15.2 |
| IDA & IBRD Borrowing Members | 16.5 | 19.2 | 18.9 | 21.6 | 29.2 | 37.0 | 38.0 |

Source: [Galan, Leandro 2019].

According to Chinese scholars, the result of these changes was the division of the current international institutions into three types: traditional, modified and innovative.

1. Traditional International Institutions

Traditional international institutions refer to those created during the Cold War by the traditional hegemonic powers based on the old world political and economic order, such as the UN system, World Bank, IMF, GATT and some others. The fundamental rules of these institutions were designed and implemented under the leadership of the traditional superpowers, mainly the United States. The main beneficiaries of this system naturally turned out to be

its creators. In this structure, it is impossible to achieve equal dialogue and cooperation due to the limitations and selective preferences of traditional major powers in managing and solving global problems.

II. Modified-improved International Institutions

Modified-improved international institutions refer to the newly founded international cooperation institutions in the 1990s after the Cold War and some old international institutions that have undergone some reforms and adjustments, for instance G20, APEC, Asia Europe Meeting, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three, WTO, etc. Their difference lies in the fact that, under pressure from the international community, developing countries were included in these structures, so the voice of the non-Western world became more distinguishable in international affairs.

III. Innovative International Institutions

Innovative international institutions are those that have appeared since the beginning of the twenty-first century, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS Bank, CICA, the 16 + 1 mode of cooperation among China and the Central and East European countries, the AIIB, the Belt and Road strategic framework, etc. They are fundamentally different from the institutions of the old world order, since they were created by the main developing countries to protect their own interests in solving global problems of peace and development. Based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and win-win for all members, these institutions are established in areas that have remained outside the scope of traditional international institutions. Their number and role in global governance will only increase [Chen, 2018, 112, 113]. In fact, “innovative” means alternative or parallel structures of the international system, which is presented in table 4.

Table 4. Parallel International Structures, created by China

| Organizations and mechanisms with China at the center | Main characteristics | What international structures does it duplicate |
|---|--|--|
| Financial and monetary policy | | |
| BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) | Development Bank with a focus on infrastructure projects, established in July 2014; headquarters in Shanghai; for the first five years, the president of the bank is a representative of India | World Bank, regional development banks |
| Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) | The initiative was announced at the APEC summit in October 2013 with an initial capital of \$50 billion | Asian Development Bank |
| BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) | Estimated size \$100 billion; announced July 2014 | International Monetary Fund |
| Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM); ASEAN+3; Asian Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) | Announced amount of 240 billion dollars (“Multilateralization” started in March 2010, AMRO in April 2011; received the status of an international organization in 2014) | International Monetary Fund |
| Renminbi Internationalization Mechanisms | Ten agreements on the direct exchange of the yuan with other currencies; non-cash banking agreements in nine countries; seven RQFII country quotas; 26 swap agreements with central banks | Established foreign exchange market mechanisms |

| Organizations and mechanisms with China at the center | Main characteristics | What international structures does it duplicate |
|---|--|---|
| Shanghai as a global financial center with yuan futures markets | Decision of the State Council (2012) to turn Shanghai into a world financial center; Approval of the Shanghai FTA (August 2013). Futures markets in RMB for crude oil, natural gas, petrochemicals (August 2014); gold trading platform (autumn 2014); six other international commodity futures markets are in the planning stage | Existing centers for financial, commodity and futures markets |
| China International Payments System (CIPS) | CIPS for international transactions in RMB (April 2012); Sino-Russian negotiations on alternatives to SWIFT (autumn 2014) | Established payment systems (CHIPS, etc.) |
| Universal Credit Rating Group (UCRG) | Joint project of three rating agencies (Dagong, RusRating, Egan-Jones) (since June 2013); NDRC and MFA launch a joint research project to prepare an Asian rating system (June 2014) | S & P, Moody's, Fitch |
| China Union Pay (CUP) | Association of Card Issuing Banks (since 2002); currently adopted in 140 countries, released in 30 countries, most recently: Russia (August 2014), Myanmar (September 2014) | VISA, MasterCard |

Source: [China Monitor, 28 October 2014, no 18].

China has also managed to create a well-structured global network of partnerships (strategic and conventional) in five macro-regions of the world. At the top of this pyramid are regional forums primarily dedicated to economics, trade and infrastructure: China-Arab Cooperation Forum, China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China-SELAC Forum (with Latin American countries), Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Format 17 + 1, which again turned into 16+1 (after the withdrawal of Lithuania in 2021). At the base of the pyramid are agreements with more than 140 countries on establishing partnerships [Grachikov 2019a; 2019b].

In the context of this typology, China's identity in these international structures is changing. First, in traditional institutions, China identifies itself as a participant and supporter. China "radically" does not deny or oppose the existing system and order, but tries to play a positive role corresponding to its power. Second, in modified institutions, the PRC presents itself as supportive and reformer, realizing that it has little chance of becoming a leader and dominant player in the near future. China can also play the role of participant and builder here, reforming the old order if possible. Finally, in innovation institutions, China positions itself as a supporter and leader. These institutions were originally created by China and other developing countries and therefore China plays a leading and guiding role in these structures. The main advantage of innovative institutions based on the principles of collaborative discussion, creation and jointness is that they will serve to "create a new international order" [Chen, 2018].

Conclusion

International organizations have become the main arena of world diplomacy and global competition between China and the United States. They play a key role in global governance and provide platforms for collaborative solutions and international issues. China, as one of the centers of the "new bipolarity" and a structure-forming actor in international relations, has a significant impact on the institutions of global governance, and the future model of the world order largely depends on its position.

China, actively participating in existing international organizations and trying to reform them from within in accordance with its own norms and rules, proactively creates new international structures in which it plays a leading role and can indirectly influence the development and adoption of decisions that are beneficial to it.

The new “innovative” international organizations of the PRC, as a rule, do not include Western countries and, therefore, can be viewed as Beijing’s desire to format a new non-Western system of international relations, or, in a broader sense, as Fyodor Lukyanov noted, the “collective East,” where quite naturally, one can include the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (OCST), the SCO, the EAEU, the AIIB, BRICS and almost all regional international organizations of the developing countries of the Global South.

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